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April 6, 2007 draft
Decisions about Coercion: The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege Waiver Problem
by Daniel Richman*
(early draft – please don’t quote from without permission)
DePaul Symposium piece 
Abstract: This symposium essay explores the contestable empirical and normative assumptions
that underlie criticisms of the Justice Department’s policies with respect to the waiver of
corporate attorney-client and work-product privileges.  And it considers how authority with
respect to prosecutorial decisionmaking in this area ought to be allocated.
* * * * * * *
For almost a decade, law reviews and hearing rooms have resounded with cogent
arguments that, for corporations at least, the attorney-client privilege has been chilled, eroded,
attacked, even killed by the federal government’s (mis) use of its bargaining leverage.   Of1
course, given that most federal criminal defendants plead guilty and that an extraordinary large
percentage of them provide information and testimony against others in order to avoid harsh
sentences, one might equally say that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution
are on their last legs in the federal system (and in state systems as well), as are the rules of
evidence and other ostensibly sacred adjudicatory principles.2
The simple fact is that “death”or (more formally) “waiver” abounds in our system.  So
does “coercion” (if the term is understood in its ordinary language sense).  Put differently, the
Electronic copy of this paper is available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=968469
See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 Ford. L. Rev.3
2117 (1998).
Id.; see also Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their4
Prosecutors, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 749 (2003).
See Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of5
Department Components and United States Attorneys (December 12, 2006) (hereinafter
“McNulty Memo”), available at  http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf
2
reality of the system bears little resemblance to the regime of robust rights ostensibly promised
by black-letter procedural law.   This disjunction can be disturbing to outsiders, but insiders are3
pretty much enured to it.  Some, like Jerry Lynch, even embrace it, or at least remind us that mere
deviation from our touted adversarial ideal does not necessarily make our system unreasonable or
unjust.   4
This backdrop of waiver as the normal way of doing business presents special challenges
to those who would complain of government privilege waiver demands and to those who would
assess and perhaps address those complaints.  That a potential criminal defendant is obliged to
surrender a useful right as the price of avoiding prosecution is not – in of itself – particularly
interesting or troubling, especially where that party has adequate access to zealous and competent
legal counsel (something that all too many criminal defendants lack).  What if anything about this
particular waiver demand is problematic? While the literature is filled with arguments by
academics who fear that the flickering of corporate privileges presages a more general threat to
attorney-client protections and by able white collar defense counsel concerned with the plight of
their individual and corporate clients and with the independence and esprit of their own
profession, their claims generally rest of on a number of quite contestable empirical and
normative propositions.  These, I will discuss in Part I of this essay.  
Often, in the face of empirical or policy uncertainty, we reach for doctrinal tools to
truncate or advance the analysis.  However, as Part II will show, waiver is so enshrined in our
doctrine as to render such tools of limited use for those dissatisfied or uneasy with government
practices in this area.  The general (and perhaps a bit odd) approach is to assign broad rights to
defendants and extraordinarily coercive sanctioning powers to the government, and to ratify the
results of the ensuing bargaining process.  White collar lawyers appear to recognize this as well,
hence their unusual prolificacy and pleas for legislative intervention.  In the face of this lobbying,
however, we ought to pause to consider the current status quo – a world in which the possibility
of a waiver demand is on the table, but subject to due consideration within a U.S. Attorney’s
Office (which, in the wake of the December 2006 “McNulty Memo,”  must act in consultation5
with the Criminal Division of Main Justice).  This is not negligible oversight, but it is quite
different from the absolute prohibition or stringent centralized regulation that critics seek. 
Consideration of a legislative or administrative alternative to the current regime thus requires an
exploration of the effect that the locus of decisionmaking has on decisions in the Justice
Electronic copy of this paper is available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=968469
Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, to all Component6
Heads and United States Attorneys (June 16, 1999) (hereinafter “Holder Memo”); see also Philip
Urofsky, Prosecuting Corporations: The Federal Principles and Corporate Compliance Programs,
U.S. Attys’ Bull., Mar. 2002, at 19.
Holder Memo, supra note __, at __.  In October 2001, the SEC noted that it too would7
consider a company’s readiness to waiver its privilege when assess the extent of its cooperation
with an investigation.  See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency
Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Release 34-44969, available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm; see also Lucas, Shapiro & Song, supra
note __, at 631.  The focus here, however, will be on criminal investigations and proceedings.
Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of8
Department Components and United States Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003) (hereinafter “Thompson
Memo”), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/business_organizations.pdf; see also
Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World:
The Thompson Memo In Theory and Practice, 43 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1095 (2006).
Thompson Memo, supra note )), at 7 n.3.9
3
Department.  And this exploration, I hope, offers both a case study and some practical help in
figuring out how we navigate in a world with few clear doctrinal or even normative certainties.
Part I
Some facts are not in dispute.  In 1999, Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder issued a
Memorandum, entitled “Federal Prosecution of Corporations” but soon called the “Holder
Memo,”  that counseled prosecutors to consider a number of factors when determining whether6
to bring charges against a corporate target.  Among these factors was the “corporation’s timely
and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its
agents, including, if necessary, the waiver of the corporate attorney-client and work product
privileges.”   In early 2003, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson issued a policy7
memorandum on “Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations” that, while
identical in substance on this point, was mandatory in nature.   This memo noted that any waiver8
sought “should ordinarily be limited to the factual internal investigation and any
contemporaneous advice given to the corporation concerning the conduct at issue.  Except in
unusual circumstances, prosecutors should not seek a waiver with respect to communications and
work product related to advice concerning the government’s criminal investigation.”9
The consequences of this policy articulation are somewhat less clear.  In a late 2003
interview, then U.S. Attorney (and soon to be Deputy Attorney General) James Comey noted that
a corporation’s willingness to waive privilege was not a “litmus test” when it come to charging
Interview with U.S. Attorney James B. Comey Regarding Dep’t of Justice’s Policy on10
Requesting Corporations under Criminal Investigation to Waive the Attorney Client Privilege
and Work Product Protection, U.S. Attys’ Bulletin, November 2003, at 1, 2.
Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective Cooperation by Business Organizations and the Impact11
of Privilege Waivers, 39 Wake Forest L. Rev. 587, 598 (2004).
Memorandum to Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys, dated12
October 21, 2005, from Robert D. McCallum, Jr., available at
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decisions and that he had not seen evidence that waivers were routinely demanded.  The
Department simply “expect[ed] cooperating corporations to help us catch the bad guys.”  He
explained:
If a corporation can do that without a waiver, prosecutors should give them the
opportunity to do that.  If the questions are fully answered without a waiver, prosecutors
should consider that to be meaningful cooperation in evaluating all factors in making the
charging decision.  If a corporation wishes to go farther and share work product and
privileged materials in order to enhance the Government’s investigation, so much the
better.  Whether a corporation’s failure to cooperate at all, or failure to waive if necessary
to answer those questions, will result in a charge, is a separate issue that can only be
answered by evaluating all the factors.10
In 2004, the Department’s point person on the issue, Mary Beth Buchanan, drew on a
2002 survey of all U.S. Attorney’s Office to report that “requests for waiver of the attorney-client
privilege or work product protection were the exception rather than the rule.”  She added that
“those who argue that waivers are required frequently do so on the basis of anecdotes without
any supporting data.”   11
In 2005, the Department offered a sop to critics in the form of the Memorandum by
Acting Deputy Attorney General Robert D. McCallum, Jr., dated October 21, 2005 (“the
McCallum Memo”).  While reaffirming prior departmental policy, it added:
To ensure that federal prosecutors exercise appropriate prosecutorial discretion
under the principles of the Thompson Memorandum, some United States Attorneys have
established review processes for waiver requests that require federal prosecutors to obtain
approval from the United States Attorney or other supervisor before seeking a waiver of
the attorney-client privilege or work product protection.  Consistent with this best
practice, you are directed to establish a written waiver review process for your district or
component. . . .  Such waiver review processes may vary from district to district (or
component to component), so that each United States Attorney or component head retains
the prosecutorial discretion necessary, consistent with circumstances, to seek timely,
complete, and accurate information from business organizations.12
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00163.htm.
Julie O’Sullivan, Does the DOJ’s Compelled-Voluntary Privilege Waiver Policy13
Undermine Corporate Client’s Willingness to Communicate with Counsel and Counsel’s Ability
to Ensure Corporate Legal Compliance?  A Preliminary “No,” at 11 (draft).
The survey received 676 responses from in-house counsel and 538 from outside14
counsel.  The Decline of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Context at 2-3 n.7
(hereinafter “Survey”), available at http://www.acca.com/Surveys/attyclient2.pdf.  
Id. at 3; see also In re Qwest, 450 F.3d 1179, __ (10  Cir. 2006) (noting efforts of15 th
amicus Ass’n of Corporate Counsel to draw court’s attention to “culture of waiver”).
Survey at 6.16
Survey at 4.17
Comey Interview at 1.18
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This memo’s chief significance was thus negative, as it implicitly rejected both challenges to
existing waiver practices and calls for greater centralized supervision of waiver demands.
Meanwhile, those on the other side of the already heated debate tried to go beyond
anecdote – albeit in surveys that, as Julie O’Sullivan notes, “were not conducted with even
minimal rigor.”   A survey by the Association of Corporate Counsel of its members and, through13
other organizations in the “Coalition to Preserve the Attorney-Client Privilege,” of white collar
practitioners  found widespread belief among respondents that “a ‘culture of waiver’ has14
evolved in which governmental agencies believe it is reasonable and appropriate for them to
expect a company under investigation to broadly waive attorney-client privilege or work product
protections.”   Although the survey inquired about all enforcement agencies, respondents made15
clear that U.S. Attorneys’ Offices were the primary demanders of waivers.   Of the respondents16
who had actually been investigated, “55% of outside counsel responded that waiver of the
attorney-client privilege [had been] requested by enforcement officials either directly or
indirectly,” and 27% of in-house counsel “confirmed this to be true.”17
What privileged or protected materials were prosecutors seeking?  Back in November
2003, U.S. Attorney Comey asserted that “prosecutors are not generally seeking legal advice or
opinion work product; they are just seeking the facts, including factual attorney work product. 
Of course, disclosure of interview notes or the facts contained in the notes reflects the questions
asked by the attorney, which may result from prior research, as well as the attorney’s focus
during the interview.  The disclosure, however, involves a minimal intrusion on the privilege...”  18
The 2006 Corporate Counsel survey largely corroborated that, but did find, for those respondents
reporting the nature of materials demanded, that 15% of the requests experienced by in-house
counsel and 20% of those experience by outside counsel had involved materials relating to the
Survey at 9.19
U.S. Sentencing Commission, Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, May 18,20
2006, at 45, available at http://www.ussc.gov/2006guid/FinalUserFrdly.pdf (eliminating last
sentence of Application Note 12 to § 8C2.5, which stated: “Waiver of attorney-client privilege
and of work product protections is not a prerequisite to a reduction in culpability score [] unless
such waiver is necessary in order to provide timely and thorough disclosure of all pertinent
information known to the organization.”).  The amendment  took effect on Nov. 1, 2006, in the
absence of congressional modification. [check]
152 Cong. Rec. S11438-39 (daily edition) (statement of Sen. Specter) (“Attorney-Client21
Privilege Protection Act of 2006"). [KEEP THIS CURRENT for 110  CONG]TH
According to its website, “Lawyers for Civil Justice” plays a unique role in the civil22
justice reform movement by coalescing the resources of the defense trial lawyers with the support
of a significant segment of the business community.”  See
http://www.lfcj.com/process.cfm?PageID=2.
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advice of counsel.  (The survey report regrettably lumped together situations in which an “advice
of counsel” defense was being asserted and those in which it was not – as well as cases in which
advice sought related “to the investigation itself (rather than the underlying conduct being
investigated).”)19
The immediate audience for the Corporate Counsel survey was the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, and the response from the Commission must have been gratifying.  Thereafter, in
May 2006, the Commission amended the Sentencing Guidelines to eliminate language that had
been “misinterpreted to encourage waivers.”   Given that the Guidelines speak only to20
sentencing, however, and not to the demands that the government makes as a condition for letting
an company avoid criminal liability altogether, the significance of this advocacy victory has so
far been limited (as it will continue to be unless the Commission’s decision influences Congress
or the Justice Department). 
More balm for critics came early in December 2006, when Senator Specter, in the last
months of chairing the Judiciary Committee, introduced legislation that among other things,
would bar the government from demanding the waiver of an organizational attorney-client
privilege, and would bar it from considering an entity’s assertion of that privilege when deciding
whether to pursue criminal (or civil) charges.   Then, on December 12, Deputy Attorney21
General, during a speech to the “Lawyers for Civil Justice” (a business and defense lawyer
group)  in New York, announced a revision of the Thompson Memo.  While not addressing the22
common scenario in which a corporation, for its own reasons, “volunteers” to waive its privilege
as to certain materials (save for requiring that a record be maintained of such a waiver), the
McNulty Memo somewhat tightens the internal regulations on prosecutors who explicitly ask for
the most frequently sought privileged materials – documents, interview memoranda, and “reports
See Jenny Anderson, Sharply Divided Reactions to Report on U.S. Markets, N.Y.23
Times, Dec. 1, 2006, at C8.
Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (Dec. 5, 2006), at 85,24
available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf
Id. at 86.  The report, like the McNulty Memo, also addressed the degree to which a 25
prosecutor’s charging calculus can include a corporation’s advancement of legal fees to its
employees.   See KPMG case.  I do not address this issue here, although much of my discussion
is relevant to it.
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containing investigative facts documented by counsel.”  Before requesting that a corporation
waive its privilege on these “Category I” materials, a line prosecutor must obtain written
authorization from the U.S. Attorney, who must in turn consult with the head of the Criminal
Division in Washington.  Before seeking waiver of privilege as to “Category II material –
materials revealing “legal advice given to the corporation before, during, and after the underlying
misconduct” – however, prosecutors must obtain the written permission of the Deputy Attorney
General himself, unless the material sought relates to the underlying misconduct and the
corporation or one of its employees is relying on an advice-of-counsel defense, or the advice falls
within the crime/fraud exception to the privilege.  Prosecutors may consider a corporation’s
response to a request for Category I material when deciding whether a firm has cooperated.  They
cannot consider a firm’s refusal to waive as to Category II material.
Although its promulgator has billed it as such, it is far from clear that the McNulty Memo
constitutes much of a departure from existing practice.  But it does signal a tactical retreat by the
Department, and perhaps even the beginning of a new quietism toward corporate crime. 
Certainly some influential interests would applaud the latter.  Just nine days before the Memo’s
release, the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation – formed with the support of the Secretary
of the Treasury  – released its “interim” report, which, among other things, recommended that23
the Justice Department “revise its [] guidelines so that firms are only prosecuted in exceptional
circumstances of pervasive culpability throughout all offices and ranks,”  and that the24
Department also “revise its prosecutorial guidelines to prohibit federal prosecutors from seeking
waivers of the attorney-client privilege.”   Others too have argued that the pendulum has swung25
too far in the direction of enforcement as a result of overaction to Enron et al.
Part B
What exactly is at stake here, beyond the obvious point that the government is using its
considerable bargaining leverage to extract waiver of a valuable legal right from corporate
entities, which recognize that the decision to charge – regardless of outcome and sentence – can
put a company out of business or close to it?  What are the consequences of the government’s
practices in this area?  Before turning to the (inadequate) doctrinal tools available to assess a
The survey report notes: “We believe the survey’s response rate can be considered26
robust; but since we are not an independent surveying company or statisticians, we can make no
proffer that the sampling is statistically significant or representative of the entire profession.” 
Survey at 3 n.7.
The strenuous effort that the Justice Department has made in capital cases provide a27
remarkable (although understandable) contrast to its efforts in non-capital cases.  See Daniel
Richman, Institutional Coordination and Sentencing Reform, 84 Texas L. Rev. 2055, 2068
(2006); John Gleenson, Supervising Federal Capital Punishment: Why the Attorney General
Should Defer When U.S. Attorneys Recommend Against the Death Penalty, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1697
(2003); Stephen P. Klein, Richard A. Berk & Laura J. Hickman, Race and the Decision to Seek
the Death Penalty in Federal Cases (2006) (RAND report), available at
http://rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR389.pdf
See Wray & Hur, supra note __, at 1177 (“Mutual misunderstandings between [pros &28
defense attys] can help explain the chasm between the Justice Dept’s accounts of the rarity of
waiver requests and the defense bar’s vehement insistence that they occur routinely.”).
Analogy might be made to Hobbs Act cases in which extortion “under color of official29
right” can be found where a public official takes money from a private citizen with knowledge of
8
regime of effectively coerced waiver, let us consider the broader policy issues.
These critical questions are rather difficult to answer given the available data.  Although
the “Coalition to Preserve the Attorney-Client Privilege” purports to have made a concerted
effort to go beyond anecdote and document the extent to which a “culture of waiver” indeed
prevails among government enforcers, its survey results still give only a sketchy picture of the
alleged problem.  Respondents offered some telling quotations, but they were not necessarily
representative of all practitioners in the area or even of all members of the organizations
involved.   Moreover, without raw data, it is hard to discern the degree to which responses26
reflected general perceptions, as opposed to personal experience.  There is also, as noted above,
no clarity about the extent to which prosecutors have sought access to materials relating to advice
of counsel in situations other than those in which an advice of counsel defense has been asserted.
For its part, the Justice Department has – so far at least – assiduously avoided providing a
more rigorous picture of how its minions have conducted themselves on this issue.  To be fair,
collecting data of this sort, particularly when a request for information is not accompanied by a
regime of strict centralized control, has always been a challenge for the Department.   And even27
if Main Justice, by some miracle, received complete and details reports from the field about
negotiations with corporate counsel, there would remain issues about signals received by counsel
but not intentionally or explicitly sent by prosecutors.   Prosecutors can make clear demands. 28
But they can also make casual suggestions.  Or say nothing, but profit from defense counsel
perceptions of government expectations, and leave them uncorrected.   That said, given how29
that person’s expectation that the official will do something in return.  See Evans v. United
States, 504 U.S. 255, 274 (1992); United States v. Giles, 246 F.3d 966, 972 (7  Cir. 2001).th
In his testimony before the Sentencing Commission, Deputy Attorney General30
McCallum noted that the Department had been requesting information-gathering assistance from
the ABA subcommittee looking at privilege waiver See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Public
Hearing, Mar. 15, 2006, at 47, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/hearings/03_15_06/0315USSC.pdf.  In addition, DOJ and the SEC have
stated that they will be providing empirical data on the subject during the comment period for
proposed FRE 502.  (Per Dan Capra)
Possible note re Milberg Weiss as a special case.  There, waiver re prior dealings with31
named representatives appears to have been sought.
See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 105 (1988); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 4332
(1906); see Julie O’Sullivan, draft at 22 (“[B]ecause it lacks a Fifth Amendment privilege, a
corporation can protect the results of its investigation – at least until it chooses how it will act on
the report – only by using lawyers who can shield their work under the attorney-client privilege
and work product doctrine.”).
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well reticence has served its legislative purposes (until now), one can wonder about the
Department’s commitment to obtain data in this area.30
At this juncture – pending the kind of data that the McNulty Memo may produce -- let us
assume, at least for purposes of argument, corporate counsel’s claims that privilege waiver is
regularly on the table when a corporation seeks to avoid prosecution by demonstrating
“cooperation.”  And, in the absence of precise data about the contours of the data sought or
obtained by prosecutors, let us also assume that the waives sought and/or obtained encompass all
factual materials gathered by inside or outside counsel as part of their internal investigation into
the matters of concern to the government.  This would include written internal reports prepared
by counsel, as well as the underlying interview notes and memos that, like the reports
themselves, would otherwise be protected against disclosure by some combination of the
attorney-client and work product privileges.31
A good case can be made for a regime of broad disclosure by corporations – coerced,
prodded, encouraged, or simply appreciated by the government.  Although corporations have no
Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination,  the collective knowledge of these32
artificial “persons” often cannot be tapped without the participation of corporate counsel. 
Natural persons are subjected to intensive government debriefings as a condition of cooperation,
to ensure that they fully disclose what they know about the matters being investigated, and many
other matters as well.  The only way a corporation can render an analogous degree of cooperation
is through the disclosure of all factual materials in its control, including (indeed, especially) those
gathered by its lawyers.  As is always the case when the government uses the explicit or implicit
See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (prosecutor's offer to accept33
a guilty plea to a lesser charge "no more than openly presented the defendant with the unpleasant
alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he was plainly subject to prosecution");
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 (1973) ("Although every [plea bargain] has a
discouraging effect on the defendant's assertion of his trial rights, the imposition of these difficult
choices [is] an inevitable attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the
negotiation of pleas"); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970) ("We decline to hold,
however, that a guilty plea is compelled and invalid under the Fifth Amendment whenever
motivated by the defendant's desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty rather
than face a wider range of possibilities extending from acquittal to conviction and a higher
penalty authorized by law for the crime charged."); United States v. Cruz, 156 F.3d 366, 374 (2d
Cir. 1998).
Lisa Griffin suggests that, already, as a result of government waiver demands, “some34
corporations have limited internal investigations to pare down the amount of potential
misconduct and proprietary information that must be revealed to the government.”  Lisa Kern
Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
101, 132 (2007) (SSRN pageproofs).  The Business Week article that she cites for support, id. at
132 n.175, however, offers little clear evidence of this; to be fair, however, clear empirical of the
point would be hard to find.
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threat of prosecution to obtain information, the subject of the pressure would prefer it otherwise.   
But given the alternatives – possible prosecution, or just a sustained grand jury investigation –
the coercion involved seems little different from the sort generally tolerated in the criminal
justice system.33
Why then ought we be especially concerned about the government’s coercive efforts to
obtain these materials?  Obviously, these efforts put firms at a disadvantage.  But what are the
social costs? Those arguing against such practices have made forceful arguments that will only
be sketched out here.  The goal is less to support or oppose them than to consider their
underlying empirical or normative assumptions.
Plight of firms
The first category of criticism focuses on the plight of corporations in a world in which
their internal investigations or inquiries may end up being transparent to the government.  Should
this prospect lead firms to engage in fewer internal investigations, the social cost of a waiver
regime would be grave indeed.  The likelihood of this happening, however, seems somewhat
slim.   Corporate managers already have considerable legal and economic incentives to “strive34
Lonnie T. Brown, Reconsidering the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A Response35
to the Compelled-Voluntary Waiver Paradox, 34 Hofstra L. Rev. 897, 903 (2006); see also
Comey, supra note __, at 3 (“We have seen no evidence at all that corporations will refrain from
conducting internal investigations because, in order to obtain leniency for cooperating, they
might be asked to waive a privilege.”).
See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Po. Econ.36
169 (1968).
O’Sullivan, supra note __, draft at 48.37
See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at  398 (discussing why we don’t want to deter lawyers from38
writing stuff down).
Thanks to Julie O’Sullivan for this point.39
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for legal compliance irrespective of the prospect of privilege waiver.”   The costs of failing to35
inquire into questionable conduct can be great, and the government may not even take an interest
in the matter.  Moreover, should existing incentives not be sufficient in this regard, they could be
increased, particularly on the civil or criminal sanctioning side.36
Maybe firms will keep asking for internal inquiries, but the lawyers will be less zealous
and effective in conducting them.  Yet as Julie O’Sullivan cuttingly notes, defense counsel’s
argument that “their duty of effective representation requires them to compromise the
investigation” sounds very much “like an argument that a lawyer’s ethical duty to the entity
requires – in light of the possibility of prospective privilege waiver requests – that lawyers
commit malpractice while investigating.”   O’Sullivan is aptly skeptical of this argument.37
A subtler chilling effect argument considers counsel’s own interests.  Even if one makes
the (rather heroic) assumption that a clean distinction can be drawn between factual material and
legal advice, and that only the former will be routinely disclosed to the government, counsel may
still be reluctant to create materials that will be subject to prosecutorial scrutiny and make them
subjects of such scrutiny.   At worst, there is a risk of obstruction charges.  At best, the lawyer is38
a potential government witness.   The power of this argument is up for question, however.  After39
all, prosecutors are regularly in the position of being potential witnesses too.  Although
prosecutors generally don’t have to worry about obstruction charges, it’s not clear that corporate
defense counsel really worry either.
Ironically, another argument is in part driven by the assumption that potential civil
sanctions, at least those imposed at the behest of private plaintiffs, are already too great. 
Corporations will indeed continue to conduct internal investigations, and they will comply with
prosecutorial waiver demands, the argument goes.  But then they will unfortunately face
disclosure of these sensitive materials not just to the government but to private plaintiffs. 
See infra ---40
See In re Qwest, 450 F.3d 1179, __ (10  Cir. 2006) (collecting cases); more41 th
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the42
Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 Md. L. Rev. 215, 222  (1983); [note that  collateral
estoppel is often not available] 
Colin P. Marks, Corporate Investigations, Attorney-Client Privilege, and Selective43
Waiver: Is a Half-Privilege Worth Having at All? 30 Seattle Univ. L. Rev. 155, 189-90 (2006).
Indeed, the ability of shareholders to diversify, among other things, raises questions44
about the whole project of securities class actions.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the
Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 Colum. L. Rev.
1534 (2006).
See Coffey, Rescuing, supra ___;  Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the45
Role of the Plaintiff, 60 Law & Contemp. Probs. 167 (1997).
See George J. Terwilliger III & Darryl S. Lew, Privilege in Peril: Corporate Cooperation46
in the New Era of Government Investigations, 7 Engage (Journal of Fed. Soc’y’s Practice
Groups) 25, 30 (Mar 2006) (“The uncertainty regarding principles of limited waiver also can
dampen corporations’ enthusiasm for cooperating with government investigation.”).
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Outside the Eighth Circuit (and in the absence of congressional action ), there is no clear40
doctrine of “selective waiver,” of the sort that would allow a corporation to assert its privileges
against other plaintiffs after it has disclosed otherwise privileged materials to the government.  41
At first blush, this scenario does not seem that troubling.  After all, why should we be concerned
if the litigation costs to deserving plaintiffs are reduced?  We often permit private plaintiffs to
piggyback off criminal convictions with offensive collateral estoppel.   Why not let them42
similarly take advantage of the government’s entire investigative haul?  Indeed, one can argue
that “private litigants have no less of an interest [than the government] and may be better suited
to achieving the goals of deterrence and punishment of corporations.”43
At second blush, the introduction of private litigants into the mix may be more
problematic since all plaintiffs are not “deserving.”   The internal investigation that either clears44
the firm so far as the government is concerned or provides evidence of misconduct so equivocal
as to be unworthy of prosecutorial pursuit might still provide grist for one or more civil suits that,
though not meritorious, still need to be bought off or litigated.   Effectively subsidizing these45
suits through a privilege waiver regime could lead to overdeterrence, which is of societal
concern.  Alternatively, a firm otherwise ready to fully cooperate with any government
investigation might think twice about cooperating when the consequence is such subsidization.46
See William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional47
Responsibilities of the Business Lawyer, 75 Ford. L. Rev. 1454, 1468 (2006) (“Given [the] long-
standing limits on the privilege, it has always been irrational for a manager to make disclosures
to the corporation’s counsel that she would not have been willing to make in the absence of any
confidentiality safeguards.”).
See Lonnie Brown, supra note __  at 904 (“Corporate constituents [] could legitimately48
distrust the security provided to them by the corporate privilege, given that it belongs to the
corporation rather than to them individually.”); Buchanan, supra note __, at 599-600; John E.
Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 443, 509 (1982) (“[I]n those cases where the information-holder has a personal, as well as
corporate, legal interest in the information he possesses, the possibility that the corporation might
waive the attorney-client privilege, thereby rendering the information discoverable, would create
a powerful incentive either to refuse to communicate with the attorney or to prevaricate.”).
See William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of49
Compliance, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1343, __ (1999).
See Zornow & Krakauer, supra note __, at 157 (waiver demand has “effect of chilling50
the inquiry from the outset and often has an adverse impact on the relationships among senior
management and lower-level employees.”). 
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Then there is the risk that a waiver regime would result, not in any reluctance of
corporations to conduct internal investigations, but in less productive investigations because
officers and employees worry about providing statements that will thereafter be turned over to
the government.  This risk might be quite limited, however, since officers and employees would
have (or at least ought to have) these concerns even without prosecutorial waiver demands.   The47
privilege belongs to the corporation, and the corporate calculus could easily dictate giving the
government information that exposes its officers and employees to criminal liability even in the
absence of a waiver demand by the government.   The possibility that a corporation will “push48
liability downward” onto individual officers or employees is a standard problem in white collar
enforcement.   Perhaps, there are officers or employees who would be forthcoming under a49
robust privilege regime, notwithstanding the corporation’s control over the privilege, because
they trust the firm to consider their personal interests and do not think it would lightly turn them
in (perhaps because they have real power within the firm).  One would expect these individuals
would be less open with internal investigators under a waiver regime that made government
access to their statements far more likely.  But the size of this class is far from clear.
One can step back from concerns relating to employee trust of internal investigators to
concerns about employee trust more generally.   When it comes to conspiracies, we often50
celebrate the mutual distrust that government cooperation incentives breed among co-
See Darryl Brown, Executive Branch Regulation, supra note __, at __; Richman,51
Cooperating Clients, 56 Ohio St. L. J. 69 (1995); Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Defendants:
The Costs and Benefits of Purchasing Information from Scoundrels, 8 Fed. Sent. Rptr. 292
(1996); Pamela S. Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation: The Changing
Vision of the Right to Counsel, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 670, __ (1992).
See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral52
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1735, 1757-59 (2001); Griffin, supra note __,
at 123 (noting how waiver demands undercut loyalty within firm).
Perhaps cite worker mobility literature, e.g. Paul Osterman, Securing Prosperity (1999);53
Paul Osterman, ed., Broken Ladders: Managerial Work in Transition (1996); Charles Heckscher,
White Collar Blues: Management Loyalties in an Age of Corporate Restructuring (1995).
See Buchanan, supra note __, at 605: (“The corporation may be able to identify quickly54
and efficiently the appropriate individuals with knowledge of the events and the relevant
documents and other evidence.  This is what makes the investigation of corporate crimes unique
and why the corporation may be in a position to benefit itself by cooperating with the
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conspirators.   That is the beauty of the Prisoner’s Dilemma – at least from a societal51
perspective; prisoners as a class are likely less keen on the phenomenon.  Within corporations,
however, trust is something we generally want to foster.   When corporations really “own” the52
information they obtain in the course of internal probes, they can fairly be expected to 
consider the costs of “betraying” the loyalty of the employee who is forthright with internal
investigators.  In a waiver regime, firms lose the ability to make and act on such calculations, as
effective “ownership” of the investigative haul is transferred to the government (when it so
chooses).  The resulting costs in internal cohesiveness may thus be greater than those that flow
simply from corporate control over the privilege.
This is, of course, a rejoinder to this trust argument: The extent to which trust drives
corporate productivity is far from clear.   Given that waivers only occur after law enforcers53
become interested in a matter, the extent to which any such trust is threatened by a waiver regime
is also unclear.  After all, many internal investigations will be conducted in matters that never
appear on any prosecutorial radar.  And even were trust eroded by such a regime, the social cost
of that erosion might well be counterbalanced by the social gains from cheaper and more
effective law enforcement.
Corporations themselves might even share the benefits of this law enforcement efficiency. 
A savvy federal enforcer will not stay within the four-corners of a internal investigation report –
even one done by the most respected outside counsel – but the report can significantly speed the
process of getting to the bottom of the matter at hand.  The enforcer who reaches the bottom (or
thinks he has) will often be satisfied and move on to other cases.  And the sooner the government
searchlight is turned off, the better for the firm.  54
government.”); see also Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules: Hearing on Proposal 502, April
24, 2006, Fordham University School of Law, at 59 (testimony of Peter Pope, Deputy Attorney
General, New York State) (noting interest of corporations in getting quick disposition of matter).
Discuss pooling equilibrium & fifth am game theory literature.  Ostensible55
“cooperation” with interrogators as way to appear innocent.   [but note that repeat player and
coordination possibilities available to defense counsel might favor development of convention
against waiving privilege.  Create pooling equilibrium favoring silence.
See William H, Simon, Whom (or What) Does the Organization’s Lawyer Represent?56
An Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 57 (2003).
See Michael C. Jensen & William H., Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,57
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,  3 J. Fin. Econ.305 (1976); Oliver E. Williamson,
Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (1975).
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This shared benefits argument might strike a corporate defender as rather paternalistic,
however.  Sure, a shareholder interests might be served by handing internal investigative
materials over to the government on a silver platter.  And, yes, even without a prosecutorial
regime that explicitly encouraged waiver, the firm seeking to signal that it had nothing to hide
would be tempted to pursue an “open file” policy with the government even where the firm’s
interests in the particular matter would best be served by non-disclosure.   But that hardly means55
that disclosure is invariably in shareholder interests.  Corporate counsel ought to be left to figure
this out for herself, especially in light of the civil plaintiffs who might be waiting in the wings.
But there is a counterclaim to the cry of paternalism: Perhaps management is not the best
judge of shareholders’ best interests in these matters.   It might be prone to overvalue the56
importance of trust within the firm. Managers themselves might have some actual or perceived
culpability in the corporate conduct being investigated.  Or having altogether different skeletons
in their own closets, they might be all too ready to confuse their personal interest in the non-
disclosure of internal corporate matters with shareholder interests.  The extent to which
managers’ interests are aligned with shareholder interests on this score will vary considerably
with the type of misconduct being pursued (or that might be disclosed), with a long continuum
running between cases of isolated self-dealing by an individual employee and sustained bid-
rigging (or violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) that primarily benefits the firm.  Even
if one assumes as a general matter that – regardless of endemic agency problems  – corporate57
managers are better situated than the government to advance shareholder interests, one can still
wonder whether this assumption holds true where the government has found reason to criminally
investigate corporate conduct. 
Of course, the challenge to the suitability of managers as guardians of the corporate
privilege – at least where government investigations are concerned – may prove too much.  If law
enforcers are indeed better placed than managers to determine when the privilege ought to be
See McLucas, Shapiro & Song, supra note __, at 636 & n.62 (citing sources); Griffin,58
supra note __, at __; Comey supra note __, at 2 (noting that a corporation has the ability to
require an employee to cooperate with its counsel on pain of dismissal).
See supra re corp control of privilege.59
See McLucas, Shapiro & Song, supra note __, at 637 (discussing Computer Associates60
charges in E.D.N.Y.); O’Sullivan draft at 60.
See Lonnie Brown, supra note __, at 939; O’Sullivan draft at 57.61
See In Re Grand Jury Subpoena, 415 F.3d 333, 340 (4  Cir. 2005)(AOL case); see also62 th
O’Sullivan draft at 59-60.
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waived, why have the privilege to begin with?  This is a fair question, one that we will return to
later.  But for now, the challenge should be seen as supporting, at the minimum, a “coerced”
waiver regime.
Plight of Officers and Employees
A second category of arguments against a coerced waiver regime evinces solicitude less
for corporate entities than for their individual officers and employees.  That these arguments are
made by corporations or those that represent them is interesting but hardly dispositive, since (as
already noted) firms do have their own interest in assuring fairness to their officers and
employees – albeit an interest that is sometimes outweighed.
Internal investigations can put an executive or employee into a difficult position (to put it
mildly).  Should she refuse to speak with interviewers, she may well lose her job.   She also58
faces the risk that, should she speak, her statements will be turned over to the government, thus
exposing her to civil or criminal liability.  As noted, this risk would be present even were the
government to eschew demands for privilege waiver, since waiver could serve the firm’s own
interests and is the firm’s to make.     Should she lie, she might even find herself charged with59
obstruction of justice.60
If our executive or employee expects that her statements to corporate counsel are
protected by an attorney client privilege that she controls, she will likely be corrected by counsel,
who ought to give her “Upjohn warnings.”   Should counsel fail to give these warnings and61
should she reasonably conclude that counsel represents her and not the firm, a court might
conclude (although it will be an uphill battle) that an attorney-client relationship exists and she
does control the privilege.   So the company that wants to maintain control over her statements62
has some incentive to make counsel’s role clear, and there some reason to believe that Upjohn
See Paul Rothstein, The Story of Upjohn Co. v. United States: One Man’s Journey to63
Extend Lawyer-Client Confidentiality, and the Social Forces That Affected It, in Evidence
Stories, 151, 176 (Richard Lempert, ed. 2006) (noting that “[i]n view of the frequency of waiver
today,” employees “necessarily know about” the “waiver incentives operating on the company”).
See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas 04-124-03 and 04-124-05, __ F.3d __ (6  Cir. July 13,64 th
2006); United States v. Schwimmer, 924 F.2d 443,446 (2d Cir. 1991) (Kastigar standard applies
where attorney-client privilege is breached).
Lance Cole, supra note __ (drawing connection to Lynne Stewart case); see also Peter J.65
Henning, Targeting Legal Advice, 54 Am. U. L. Rev. 669, __ (2005) (asserting that Justice
Department’s positions in corporate prosecutions is “symptomatic” of Department’s “broader
push against lawyers”).
See Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 102666
(2003).
The cooperation agreement of Michael J. Kopper and the Enron Task Force did contain67
such a waiver provision.  See Julie R. O’Sullivan, Federal White Collar Crime: Cases and
Materials 1302 (2d ed. 2003).  This appears to be the exception that proves the rule however.
17
warnings have become standard procedure.63
If such warnings are not being given or are inadequately given, and courts cannot be
counted on to give relief to the misled employee – by giving her control over the privilege and
protection against the derivative use of statements obtained in violation of the privilege  – any64
regime that envisions corporate waivers, whether purely strategic or coerced, is indeed
problematic.  But the most obvious cure for that problem is to do more to bolster Upjohn
warning practices.
Broader Systemic Concerns
Other arguments against a coerced waiver regime go beyond concern for corporations and
their employees per se and look to broader systemic damages that may result from such a regime. 
First, there is the argument that sees the corporate privilege as a miner’s canary.  If the
government is permitted to eviscerate the attorney-client privilege of corporations, it may next
turn to other kinds of clients.   Such slippery slope arguments are easily made and hard to65
answer.   But dots like the prosecution of Lynne Stewart seem quite unconnected to the coerced66
waiver trend, and there is little reason to expect that privilege waiver will be a non-negotiable
part of cooperation for non-cooperate clients.  67
Why doesn’t the government demand that individuals waive their attorney-client privilege 
Post Booker, the national rate for sentences “below guidelines range”because of68
defendants’ substantial assistance was 14.7%, with districts ranging from 2.5% to 39.3%.  U.S.
Sentencing Comm’n, 2005 Annual Report 47 (2006?).  And this doesn’t include defendants who
have sought to cooperate but have not received 5K1 treatment, or safety valve defendants.  The
defendants receiving 5K1 treatment obtained a 50% median decrease in the otherwise
appplicable guideline minimum sentence.  Id. at 48.
See Mezzenato, Benjamin A. Naftalis, “Queen for a Day” Agreements and the Proper69
Scope of Permissible Waiver of the Federal Plea-Statement Rules, 37 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs.
1 (2003);  Fed Bar Council Report, & more
Prosecutors’ control over 5K.1 may have been lessened by US v. Fernandez, (2d Cir.70
2006).
But see Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth71
Telling and Embellishment, 68 Ford. L. Rev.  917 (1999) (discussing how prosecutors aren’t very
good at assessing cooperator credibility).
United States v. Risha, 445 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2006) (discussing whether constructive
72
knowledge of materials in state files could be imputed to the federal prosecution because of close
involvement between the federal prosecution and state agents).
See Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, supra note __, at 787-88 (noting that “a73
great many prosecutors” see their job as “a way station, a means of acquiring human capital []
that will facilitate their representation of private clients thereafter”)
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as a down payment on the cooperation that defendants so fervently endeavor to render?   After68
all, the government does demand that defendants seeking a cooperation agreement waive the
protections of the rules that ordinarily bar the use of statements made in the course of plea
negotiations.   Why not use the enormous bargaining leverage that substantial control over the69
sentencing discounts reserved for cooperators  to obtain information from a prospective70
cooperator’s lawyer that might help a prosecutor assess the client’s credibility?  One reason this
practice has not developed may be because the perceived benefits are small and the risk great. 
The government presumes it will get the client’s complete account during the proffer sessions
that precede entry into a cooperation agreement or during the debriefing sessions that follow.   71
And the Brady issues that would arise from treating counsel as a supplemental source of
information could create more headaches than the effort is worth.  If the government has
unfettered access to defense counsel files, all “material” information in them might well be
subject to disclosure at latter trials of others.   In short, protection of the space between attorney72
and cooperator can often benefit the government as much as it benefits the cooperator.  Another
reason might simply be the respect that prosecutors – who after all have much in common with,
and will probably soon be, defense lawyers – have for the privilege.   At any rate, the fact is that73
Zornow & Krakaur, supra note __, at 147; see Lawrence D. Finder, Internal74
Investigations: Consequences of the Federal Deputization of Corporate America, 45 S. Tex. L.
Rev. 111 (2003).
See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 Ford. L. Rev.75
2117, 2144 (1998) (noting how “the regular if proportionately infrequent resort to the adversarial
trial procedure” helps “keep at least a loose rein on executive power”).
Kenneth Mann, Defending White Collar Crime: A Portrait of Attorneys at Work (1985).76
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waivers are not demanded as part of an individual’s cooperation.  And there is no reason to
expect that a prosecutorial practice peculiar to the corporate context – where corporate counsel is
the repository of information and evidence that cannot easily be duplicated by prosecutors – will
be extended outside of it. 
Indeed, the burdens that waiver demands place on corporate counsel grow out of the
special relationship between corporate counsel and corporate “knowledge.”  When an individual
seeks to cooperate with the government, he is expected to tell all he knows about the matters
being investigated and many peripheral matters (like unrelated personal misconduct), with grave
consequences often attending his failure to be completely forthcoming.  If one expects analogous
disclosure from artificial entities like corporations, to whom will one turn if not the lawyers who
may well be the only corporate agents charged with gathering all the information within the
entity’s collective knowledge?  
And yet, even if a coerced waiver regime is confined to corporate clients, we ought not
discount the threat it poses to the adversary system, not through the erosion of the privilege itself
but through the change it may bring to  white collar defense practice.  While some defense
lawyers confine their practice to individual clients, corporate clients loom large as actual or
potential sources of business in this segment of the profession.  Should corporate counsel really
start thinking of themselves as “as arm of law enforcement,”  from whence will come the74
adversarial mind-set that we rely on to ensure that the government does not overreach?  Even in a
world with vanishingly few trials, our readiness to rely on administrative and professional
controls on prosecutors has its limits.  We do want defense counsel to be able to pose a credible
threat of trial in appropriate cases.  75
Of course, for the last argument to have any bite on current policy matters, we have to
assume that the status quo in white collar practice before the waiver demands became common
represents some optimal level of adversarial zeal.  And that’s contestable.  Perhaps the
government was being outgunned by the experts in information control that Kenneth Mann
depicted so well in his study of white collar lawyers.   To the extent this was true and added to76
the expense of white collar prosecutions for the government, one could still find the cost
appropriate and the consequent level of such prosecutions either appropriate (because, say, all too
See, e.g., Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress:77
Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 Emory L.J. 1533 (1997);
Peter Henning, supra note __; Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 Am. Univ.
L. Rev. 703 (2005); Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalism, 91 Va. L. Rev. 879
(2005). 
See Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1715, __ (2006).78
McLucas, Shapiro & Song, supra note __, at 639.79
Compare Jason McLure, Has the Wave of White-Collar Prosecutions Crested? Legal80
Times, July 18, 2006 (“by some measures the crackdown on corporate criminals has stalled”);
Kelly Thornton & Onell R. Soto, San Diego Union-Tribune, Jan. 12, 2007 (suggesting that San
Diego U.S. attorney was asked to resign because of her focus on white collar and public
corruption cases at the expense of immigration and gun cases); [add more as Senate inquiry
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many white collar cases overreach and chill viable commercial conduct ) or the result of a77
misallocation of enforcement resources by the federal government (toward, say, violent crime or
drug enforcement, or, if one looks to the budget as a whole, farm subsidies).  Or, alternatively,
one could celebrate a coerced waiver regime as a welcome way to even up the balance in the war
for control over information relating to corporate liability.78
Insightful critics of a waiver regime have argued that it
leverages governmental resources and takes away the historical checks and balances that
existed in the process when the government investigated and company counsel defended
in such an investigation.  When private attorneys can effectively be commissioned into
government service through a process that will unearth every relevant scrap of relevant
information at the company’s cost, governmental budget constraints matter much less. 
There is no incentive to hold back on some investigations that would otherwise be
unproductive, and the government has nearly unlimited opportunity – with a low
threshold for cost effectiveness – to find misconduct at a public corporation.  Because the
publicity and risks of a civil or criminal trial can be so devastating to public corporations,
and especially to highly regulated corporations – both in economic and reputational terms
– they are often compelled to settle, even if it means taking positions contrary to their
officers and employees.79
One can accept most of this analysis, but come out exactly the other way if one believes
that corporate criminal enforcement is so far away from the margin that a systematic reduction of
the costs of prosecution is to be celebrated, not feared.  Even as corporate criminal enforcement
continues to attract public attention, the re-centering of the federal enforcement bureaucracy
since September 11 has put enormous strains on resource commitments outside the terrorism
area.  And whether corporate crime has remained unaffected is far from clear.   Given that even80
develops]; 2006 TRAC report; with U.S. Dep’t Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit
Division, The External Effects of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Reprioritization Efforts,
Audit Report 5-37, at 53 (September 2005) (noting that the “FBI designated corporate fraud as its
top national priority for financial crimes and has increased the number of agents handling these
matters between [fiscal years] 2000 and 2004.  Case management data from the [U.S. attorneys’
offices] also demonstrated the FBI’s increased emphasis on corporate fraud matters, showing that
the FBI had referred more matters to [those offices] during [fiscal year] 2004 than it had during []
2000.”).
See Henning, supra note __, at 696 (“it is unlikely that the government will accept the81
conclusions of an internal investigation uncritically or forego its own investigation simply
because the corporation’s lawyers have already conducted one”).
See Wray & Hur, supra note __, at 1171 ( “It makes complete sense for regulators and82
law enf officials to create incentives for companies to cooperate with government investigations. 
Government resources are finite; because it benefits investigators enormously when a company’s
often formidable resources work with the government instead of against it, prosecutors and
regulators will continue to press companies to cooperate.  To do otherwise would be both
inefficient and ineffective.  And the increasing number of investigations that proceed at a
dramatically quicker pace – the government’s success in what it has dubbed ‘real-time
enforcement’ – stems directly from the increase in corporate cooperation.”)
McLucas, Shapiro & Song, supra note __, at 640.  83
Perhaps discuss a/c rules re partnerships.  See United States v. Campbell, 73 F.3d 44 (584 th
Cir. 1996); Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92 (5  Cir. 1994).th
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a waiver regime will not bring the marginal cost of investigating and prosecuting a case down to
zero or anywhere close to it,  it is thus entirely possible that the “commissioning” of corporate81
counsel as deputies in the government’s corporate crime program will be socially beneficial.82
Yet one needs to be careful in assessing the overall “social benefit” in this area, even if
one believes that there ought to be more corporate crime prosecutions and that a waiver regime
will further that goal.  To the extent the regime skews enforcement activity and dispositions, we
might have additional concerns.  It has been suggested, for instance, that “publicly traded
companies are especially susceptible to government demands for waiver in a way that private
companies are not,” because “a private company simply does not face the punishment that
publicity and controversy can inflict at the first sign of market concern.”   If this is true, we83
would have to consider the extent to which an enforcement skew toward publicly traded
companies is justified by the peculiar agency problems endemic to broad-based ownership.  84
And so on.  
If the reader has a firm belief in the social utility of a waiver regime or the lack thereof by
See McLucas, Shapiro & Song, supra note __, at 629; see Public comments on 502 &85
ABA Task Force Report.
See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, __ (1995) (“There may be some86
evidentiary provisions that are so fundamental to reliability of the factfinding process that they
may never be waived without irreparably ‘discredit[ing] the federal courts’”) (quoting 21 C.
Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5039, at 207-208 (1977)); see also
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 192 (1988) (court may decline defendant’s waiver of his
right to conflict-free representation). 
See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at ___; United States v. Fariduddin, 469 F.3d87
1111, 1112 (7  Cir. 2006) (“Like almost all rights in the criminal process [citing Mezzanatto],th
the entitlement to a schedule of payments may be waived.”).
See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196 (1995); United States v. Brady, 397 U.S.88
742 (1970) (where leverage came from threat of death penalty later held – in another case – to be
unconstitutional); Bordenkircher v. Hayes; William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes, Plea
Bargaining and the Decline of the Rule of Law, in Criminal Procedure Stories, 351 (Carol
Steiker, ed. 2006); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 Harv. L.
Rev. 2463 (2004).
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this point, it is probably because she had some deeply held empirical and normative beliefs when
she started.  The point has been not to persuade but to explore why positions on the issue have
turned more on contestable assumptions than on reasoning.  One therefore yearns for the comfort
of settled legal principles.  But unless one has no qualms at all about waiver demands, not only is
doctrinal analysis largely unhelpful, but its indeterminancy offers a case-study in the clash and
interrelationship of substantive and procedural law. 
II.  Doctrinal and Institutional Resolutions
Critics of the waiver regime often point to the firmly rooted nature and general social
utility of the attorney-client privilege for both individuals and organizations.   Yet one gets little85
legal traction by noting the entrenched status of a right or privilege in the criminal process.  Even
as we recognize that there have to be some limits on what rights can be waived,  the general rule86
is to presume waivability.   And although many have called for some calibration of the87
bargaining pressure that the government uses to extract such waivers, the general rule is to
eschew labeling as improperly “coercive” any waiver that the government extracts through the
threat to bring charges that it is “entitled” to bring under substantive law.88
Sure, it is pretty curious that in an area of ostensibly clear public interest – the criminal
process – we have opted for what is essentially a private law regime of free bargaining: one that
allots procedural rights to citizens and organizations, grants substantive penal law “entitlements”
We rarely talk in “entitlement” terms about the government’s power to bring (and89
prevail on) a particular criminal charge.  But see Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, ___
(2000) (Thomas, J. concurring) (discussing “punishment to which the prosecution is by law
entitled for a given set of facts”).
See New York Cent. & Hudson R.R. v. U.S. 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909); United States v.90
Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9  Cir. 1972); see also Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Federalth
Criminal “Code” Is a Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes as Case Study, 96 J. Crim. L. & Crim. 643,
668  (2006) (“[G]iven the way that courts have applied these principles, it is difficult to find a
case in which a corporation cannot be tagged for the activities of its agents.”); John C. Coffee,
Jr., “No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of
Corporate Punishment, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386 (1981).
See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and91
Criminal Justice, 107 Yale. L.J. 1 (1997).
See Julie R. O’Sullivan, Federal White Collar Crime: Cases and Materials 207 (2d ed.92
2003).
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to the government,  and accepts the arrangements that emerge.  But that is pretty much the state89
of current legal doctrine.  And those who seek rhetorical leverage from existing procedural law
must confront the breadth and prosecutorial authority afforded by existing substantive criminal
law, which effectively allows a corporation to be held criminally liable for any act committed by
an employee in the course of such person’s employment that is intended to benefit the
corporation.90
Bill Stuntz has insightfully highlighted the interrelationship of substantive and procedural
criminal law.   Legislative breadth inevitably weakens procedural protections, and is often91
intended to do so.  Robustly defined constitutional and subconstitutional protections can end up
being just chits in the bargaining process that defendants must resort to in order to avoid
extraordinarily harsh punishment.  Yet recognition of the interrelationship between substantive
and procedural law does not necessarily come with a normative cash out, particularly where
neither side of the legal divide is constitutionally based or even the product of considered
legislative action.  And this is precisely the case for both corporate criminal liability and the
corporate attorney-client privilege under federal law, which both owe their existence and
contours far more to judicial fiat than to legislative choice.
As Julie O’Sullivan has noted, corporate criminal liability is mostly a matter of federal
common law: In the absence of any express provision for entity liability, courts have read it into
criminal statutes and allowed it to be based on respondeat superior.   Criticism of the92
consequent breadth of corporate criminal liability – and of Congress’s acquiescence in it – has
See, e.g., Vic Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 10993
Harv. L. Rev. 1477 (1996); Sam Buell; Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for
Imposing Criminal Liability, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1095 (1991); Developments in the Law –
Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 Harv. L. Rev.
1227 (1979); O’Sullivan, supra note __ (casebook), at 187-233; Brandon L. Garrett, Structural
Reform Prosecution, __ Va. L. Rev. __ , __  (2007)
See Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 138394
(2002).
See Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal95
Liability, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1295 (2001); Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity
Criminal Liability, 81 Ind. L.J. 473 (2006).
385 U.S. 493 (1967); see McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 40 (2002) (Kennedy, J.)96
(plurality opinion) (characterizing Garrity as case that “involved free citizens given the choice
between invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege and sustaining their economic livelihood”).
Richard Ben-Veniste & Lee H. Rubin, DOJ Reaffirms and Expands Aggressive97
Corporation Cooperation Guidelines, Legal Backgrounder, Wash. Legal Foundation, vol 18, no.
11; see Earl J. Silbert & Demme Doufekias Joannou, Under Pressure to Catch the Crooks: The
Impact of Corporate Privilege Waivers on the Adversarial System, 43 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1225,
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been sustained and cogent.   The best justification of substantive respondeat superior criminal93
liability may well be procedural: Corporate criminal liability is essentially an information-forcing
penalty default that effectively ensures that a corporation will fully cooperate with prosecutors in
the investigation of individual criminal misconduct.   Such cooperation is practically necessary,94
given the degree to which the corporation controls (or can obtain) relevant information about the
misconduct.  And imposing a duty on the corporation to provide this assistance will help clarify
the firm’s own involvement in the activity at issue.  To be sure, some may find this procedural
answer an inadequate response to the substantive law question of why we have such broad
corporate criminal liability.  Indeed, this is a rather extreme case of criminal law being
(mis?)used as a jurisdiction grant.   The point is simply that the normative status of trade offs
between the government’s power to charge and corporate control of investigative information is
up for grabs.95
Although effectively deputizing corporate counsel as prosecutorial information gatherers
does not have clear doctrinal implications, one aspect of the process may well have doctrinal
consequences that courts are now exploring.  Relying on Garrity v. New Jersey,  some white96
collar defense counsel have argued that “if the government insists that [a] company use its
disciplinary authority to encourage cooperation, an employee might seek to preclude the use of
his statements against him on that ground that such statements were the product of governmental
coercion and thus were obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.”   Indeed, two97
1233-34 (2006) (“employees who are given the choice of either speaking with corporate
investigators or losing their jobs, often without being provided with their own counsel to discuss
that choice and under threat of having their statements to the company’s lawyers disclosed to the
government,” are in the position of the defendant in Garrity).  For a sustained exploration of the
Garrity argument, see Griffin, supra note __. 
United States v. Stein 440 F. Supp.2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).98
Id. at ___ (distinguishing United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863, 869 (2d Cir. 1975)99
(Friendly, J.)).  But see Buell, supra note __, 59 Stan. L. Rev. at 127 (“Most courts have
concluded that Garrity cannot apply to statement compelled by private employers and other
private entities, even when those entities routinely share the fruits of such compulsion with state
enforcers.”) (citing D.L. Cromwell Invs. Inc. V. NASD Regulation, Inc., 279 F.3d 155 (2d Cir.
2002)).
See United States v. Garlock, 19 F.3d 441, 444 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that a private100
employer who investigated employee misconduct and reported the results did not automatically
become a state actor).
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, __ (1  Cir. 2001); United States v. Int’l101 st
Bhd. of Teamsters, 119 F.3d 210 __ (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Stein (KPMG Case), 440 F.
Supp.2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
See Michael A. Simons, Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and “Good102
Corporate Citizenship,” 76 St. John’s L. Rev. 979, 1008 (2002) (“Corporations don’t cooperate;
people do.”)
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defendants in the KPMG case were able to get Judge Kaplan to suppress their statements to
prosecutors on the theory that the government had “quite deliberately coerced, and in any case
significantly encouraged, KPMG to pressure its employees to surrender their Fifth Amendment
rights.”   Whether Judge Kaplan’s rationale would extend to statements obtained by corporate98
counsel for the purposes of an internal investigation that would later be disclosed to the
government is open to question.  After all, Kaplan had to distinguish his case from United States
v. Solomon, where the Second Circuit refused to treat a broker’s interrogation during a New York
Stock Exchange disciplinary hearing as the equivalent of government interrogation.   That an99
internal investigation is conducted in the shadow of a government agency’s regulatory capability
is not enough to transform it into state action, particularly where the questioning of employees
has been initiated for corporate purposes by corporate agents.   As so often is the case in100
unsettled common law territory, the issue is one of dueling analogies.  On one hand, the
government is clearly harnessing private power for a public purpose, to the detriment of someone
with comparatively less private power.  On the other, the government is simply requiring that the 
corporate entity demand and deliver information that the corporation “owns,”  and that it use all101
the means legally available to it to do so.   As Sam Buell has noted: “To pursue [Judge102
Samuel W. Buell, Is Criminal Procedure Different Within Legal Entities, 59 Stan. L.103
Rev. 101, 128 (2007) (forthcoming) (draft).
152 Cong. Rec. S11438-39 (daily edition) (statement of Sen. Specter) (“Attorney-104
Client Privilege Protection Act of 2006"). [KEEP THIS CURRENT for 110  CONG]TH
See Dan Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 469105
(1996); Daniel Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement
Discretion, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 757 (1999); William J. Stuntz, Pathological Politics
See United States v. Barrow, 400 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Stein, 2005106
U.S. LEXIS 1141 (E.D. Pa. 2005); United States v. Krilich, 163 F. Supp.2d 943, 947 (N.D. Ill.
2001); Benjamin A. Naftalis, “Queen for a Day” Agreements and the Proper Scope of.
Permissible Waiver of the Federal Plea-Statement Rules, 37 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 1 (2003).
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Kaplan’s] theory, we would need to develop means of determining (1) the degree of state
involvement that render’s the employer’s conduct state action, and (2) the degree of employer
action that renders that action compulsion.  These are exceedingly hard lines to draw.”  103
The absence of constitutional and common law guidance on this sensitive issue seems, at
least to opponents of the waiver regime, to be cause for legislative intervention.  And legislative
assistance may be on the way, courtesy of a bill by Senator Specter that, among other things,
would bar the government from demanding the waiver of an organizational attorney-client
privilege, and would bar it from considering an entity’s assertion of that privilege when deciding
whether to pursue criminal (or civil) charges.   There are certain technical aspects of this104
legislation that need to be ironed out, but there is, to put it mildly, something to be said for
democratically elected bodies taking the laboring oar in resolving hard public policy questions.
Given how frequently and cogently Congress is faulted for abdicating its responsibilities
on federal criminal issues generally,  it may seem a bit odd to argue that Congress should stay105
its legislative hand on this particular one.  But I do.  In a world in which Congress has generally
stood back while procedural rights are waived by those seeking to avoid or mitigate extremely
harsh criminal sanctions, the question becomes whether the case for legislative involvement is
stronger here than elsewhere – e.g. the debate about the extent to which the government can
demand individual defendant waivers as a precondition for cooperation discussions  -- or106
weaker.
To me it seems a lot weaker.  If there were any place where we might fairly expect a
satisfactory equilibrium through informal or formal internal checks on prosecutorial discretion
and formal or informal interaction between prosecutors and repeat player institutions, it would be
here.  And one need not be a whole-hearted adherent of public choice theory to worry that
legislative line-drawing will not be in the public interest where substantial corporate interests are
  Yes, I betray my biases with respect to the McDade Amendment, now codified at 28107
USC 530B, when I say this.  See Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the “American Criminal Class”:
Why Congress (Sometimes) Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. Ill. L. Rev. 599, 650-
656.
For arguments favoring limited waiver & legislation, see George J. Terwilliger III &108
Darryl S. Lew, Privilege in Peril: Corporate Cooperation in the New Era of Government
Investigations, 7 Engage (Journal of Fed. Soc’y’s Practice Groups) 25 (Mar 2006).
Compare Diversified Industries v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8  Cir. 1977) with In re109 th
Qwest Communications, 450 F.3d 1179, __(10  Cir. 2006) (collecting cases).  th
Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 502 ( c) (“In a federal or state proceeding, a disclosure of a110
communication or information covered by the attorney-client or work product protection – when
made to a federal public office or agency in the exercise of its regulatory, investigative, or
enforcement authority – does not operate as a waiver of the privilege or protection in favor of
non-governmental persons or entities.”), transmission letter from Advisory Committee (May 16,
2006), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/EV05-2006.pdf
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involved on the defense side, and no lobby but the Justice Department on the other.107
Moreover, if Congress wants to take its legislative responsibilities seriously and is
interested in tinkering with (or radically reshaping) the corporate criminal enforcement
environment, it ought not be working in a piecemeal fashion.  Indeed, the attorney-client waiver
“problem” ought to be toward the bottom of a long list of interrelated issues, including the scope
of corporate liability, the scope of corporate privileges, and the funding of white collar
enforcement units.  And before taking up this list, it would be helpful if Congress had a better
sense of the current enforcement level than that provided by hearings at which Administration
officials boast of corporate scalps and corporate defenders tell of the dreaded chill.
One caveat here.  There are good arguments for legislative intervention to ensure that the
entity forced to waive is not put at an unfair disadvantage vis a vis private plaintiffs.   Right108
now, the Eighth Circuit is the only area in the country where a company’s disclosure of
privileged materials in response to government investigative demands will not result in its
complete waiver of privilege as to all other parties (under federal law).   Acting at Congress’s109
request, the Evidence Rules Committee of the Judicial Conference has been considering a new
evidence rule that would allow selective waiver – freeing corporations to render the government
full cooperation while maintaining the ability to assert the privilege against private plaintiffs.  110
Such plaintiffs, of course, would still get the benefit of offensive collateral estoppel (should the
government bring and prevail on criminal charges), and the far earlier benefit of the signal of
merit that news of a pending criminal investigation provides.  But they are deprived of the
privileged parts of the government’s investigative haul, particularly in those cases in which the
government investigates but never brings charges.
See supra __111
See Testimony of N.Y. Deputy Attorney General Peter B. Pope, Advisory Committee112
on Evidence Rules: Hearing on Proposal 502, Apr. 24, 2006, at  57-65, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/EV_Hearing_April_2006.pdf
See Kenneth S. Broun & Daniel J. Capra, Getting Control of Waiver of Privilege in the113
Federal Courts – A Proposal for a Federal Rule of Evidence 502, draft at 37 (2006), available at 
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6665&context=expresso
Note Bank Regulatory Act of 2006, which provides for selective waiver for disclosures to bank
regulators.
Cites re David Brodsky testimony at Fordham.  See also Colin Marks point re “band114
aid” ADD CITES IF/WHEN RULE DIES
Check re first version of Spector bill (selective waiver provision??)115
See Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner & Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and the116
Law 303-04 (1994); more
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Reasonable minds can (and have) differed on the point.  But, as already noted,  the111
calculus of a company considering whether to placate the government with a waiver (or risk
prosecution) is vastly complicated where the consequence of waiver, even where no criminal
wrongdoing is found, is exposure to private litigation.  And whether out of concern that fears of
this perhaps unwarranted exposure may chill cooperation with the government or out of a sense
of “simple fairness” that recognizes the unique degree of coercion involved in the waiver
decision and the special institutional features of public agencies,  Congress might well strike a112
more appropriate balance than the one that has been struck by courts following common law
principles that far pre-date modern enforcement practices. 113
Given these concerns, one might expect groups like the ABA Presidential Task Force on
Attorney Client Privilege and __ [others] to support the proposed Federal Rule.  They haven’t
though, and it looks like they will be successful in their opposition.  Their rationale seems to be114
that any attempt to resolve the selective waiver problem might make government waiver
demands or expectations palatable, possibly more frequent, and certainly more defensible in
Congress.  Senator Specter’s legislative proposal, as well as the recent Justice Department’s
recent efforts to limit prosecutors in this area suggest that the strategy of these business groups is
paying off.115
This brinksmanship on the part of the ABA Task Force highlights a more general theme
of corporate prosecutions.  With certain notable exceptions, they often involve a sophisticated
game of “chicken.”  Notwithstanding breadth of the law on corporate criminal liability, the116
government rarely has much interest in actually bringing charges against an entity based on the
See Darryl Brown piece re Third Party interest117
See American Lawyer articles on Andersen & Milberg, Weiss118
See Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 Ind. L. J.119
473, 476 (2006) (“in the shadow of a strikingly broad de jure rule of liability that is nearly
indistinguishable from its civil counterparts, the criminal system’s actors gradually have
developed a practice of imposing enterprise liability that looks much narrower and is tied to a
form of heightened criminal responsibility.).
See Richman, Cooperating Clients, Ohio St. L. J. at _.120
See Garrett, supra note __ .121
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criminal conduct of its agents.  Substantial (although not equal) stigma can be imposed on the
entity through civil sanctions, as can fines, penalties and forfeitures.  And, particularly in those
situations in which the collateral consequences of a corporate conviction are contractual
debarment or worse, civil proceedings will avoid or limit the harm to innocent or relatively
innocent third parties.   Sending someone to prison is not the sine qua non of criminal117
prosecutions, but it is the gold standard, and prosecutors would far prefer going after individuals
to seeking a corporate conviction.  Threatening to prosecute the entity itself is means to that end,
for without this threat, the entity would be far more tempted to protect the individuals, and
indeed may still do so if the individuals have sufficient sway within the organization.  But an
actual prosecution will generally be a sign that something has gone wrong – e.g. perceived
recalcitrance by the corporation that the government takes as both a failure to cooperate and
maybe of a “culture” of wrongdoing within the organization.    Yes, there is an aspect of118
holding the village hostage to this.  But this is frequently a village that, in addition to protecting
the wrongdoer has also profited from the wrongdoing and perhaps harbored a culture that
fostered it.119
For their part, corporate employees will find themselves in the usual prisoner’s dilemma
game with each other and the corporate entity, with each having an incentive to gain the benefits
of cooperation with the government at the expense of the others.   But vis a vis the government,120
they are also playing a game of chicken, essentially hoping that the government, out of concern
for third party interests – shareholders, customers, etc. – will swerve away from prosecuting or
credibly threatening to prosecute the entity.  The individuals would be happy to hide behind the
village, pleading the innocence of its members, fully aware that the government would prefer not
to shoot (particularly in those cases where entity indictment might well mean death).  But if
anyone has to take a plea, better the organization than the individual (at least from the
perspective of the individuals).
These bargaining dynamics are mirrored in policy discussions about privilege waivers
(and, for that matter, corporate deferred prosecutions ).  These measures allow the government121
See See Lonnie Brown at 924 & ff; David Luban, Lawyers and Justice 217-33 (1988);122
Rothstein on Upjohn in Evidence Stories; Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1998).
See Julie O’Sullivan, supra note __ (draft)123
See Lonnie Brown, supra note __; Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The124
Mythology of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 69 Notre Dame L. Rev. 157 (1993);
Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics at § 6.5.3 (1968).
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to obtain the fruits of threatened criminal charges while making it less likely that it will have to
actually pull the trigger on firms and inflict significant injury to third parties. Those that would
eliminate such half-way measures of demonstrably credible cooperation presumably would like
the government to confront just this dilemma.  Assuming that the consequent prosecutorial
investigative disadvantage were not cured by a massive increase in enforcement resources (quite
a fair assumption), the consequence (for good or ill) would be fewer corporate prosecutions, and
less pressure on firms to assist in the prosecution of their employees.
It against this extraordinary backdrop – substantive law that permits entities to be easily
prosecuted where no one really wants them prosecuted – that the debate about corporate waivers
takes place.  But it is not only on the substantive law side that there may be a large gap between
black letter law and societal interests.  Just as there are extremely good arguments that corporate
criminal liability is far too expansive, so too are there very good arguments that corporate
attorney-client privilege doctrine sweeps far too broadly.   (I will leave it to Julie O’Sullivan to122
address those arguments in a piece that she’s preparing for this symposium.)123
These substantive and procedural doctrines have much in common.  Both are judicial
constructs, established with minimal consideration of social costs, and rooted less in logic than in
contestable analogies – on the liability side, between civil and criminal liability; on the privilege
side, between individual and organizational needs.   124
Two wrongs won’t necessarily make a right.   Nor can one make a good a priori case125
that the clash of two contestable doctrines will produce a socially beneficial result.  Particularly
in the criminal justice system, so bedeviled by resource imbalances and transaction costs, one
generally has no reason to expect that the assignment of expansive defaults to each side will lead
to bargaining that produces some normatively acceptable result.  But the institutional frameworks
here allow a powerful case to be made for organic development (and legislative abstention), with
the government drawing on its substantive law power to extract procedural benefits from
organizational entities. 
See Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, supra note __.126
See Joseph F. Savage, Jr. & David S. Schumacher, Attorney-Client Privilege on the127
Rebound, Andrews Litigation Reporter (June 2006) (criticizing policy that gives “each U.S.
Attorney’s Office [] discretion to draft its own procedures, leaving defense counsel subject to the
whims of the jurisdiction in which they are practicing, unfettered by uniform, national limits.”);
see also Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. McDonnell, Devolution of Authority: The Department
of Justice’s Corporate Charging Policies, 51 St. Louis Univ. L. J. __ (Fall 2006).
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Once we consider this not an exercise in legislative line-drawing but a pragmatic matter
of institutional choice, we’ll need to think harder about the institutions involved, particularly on
the government side.  Corporations will frequently find it in their own interest to proffer
privileged materials to prosecutors, even in the absence of an explicit request, so as to signal the
extent of their cooperation and perhaps shorten the length, and perhaps depth, of the government
investigation.  And this will be true regardless of the waiver policy on the government side. 
These decisions, however, are presumably made in the face of the government’s policy
framework (if not, one is left mystified by the intensity of corporate lobbying against the
Thompson Memo).  What considerations should go into setting this framework?  How does one
choose between the Thompson Memo approach, which gave a high degree of discretion to U.S.
Attorney’s Offices; the McNulty Memo, which purports to, and may well, rein those Offices in,
and other possible administrative arrangements?
While there are no absolutes here, the natural tendency of institutional components needs
to be carefully considered.  To the extent one wants careful calibration of government pressure,
there are good arguments for leaving decisions about such calibration in the hands of line
prosecutors (and the enforcement agents with whom they work in partnership)  – the personnel126
best placed to assess the extent to which a corporation has been forthcoming and the need for
additional internal information.  Some degree of supervisory regulation seems necessary,
however, since one can hardly expect a line assistant to resist the chance to look at the other
side’s cards, and perhaps even have his investigation done for him (often by a more experienced
former Assistant representing the corporation).  The question thus becomes how many levels
should be involved in the ex ante approval process?  
There are degrees of supervision within districts, but putting these wrinkles aside, the
issue becomes whether control should rest in the district or be shared with Washington. 
Delegation of decisionmaking power to the districts has costs.  The risk that policies will differ
across districts is inherent in such a system, although the extent of district independence varies
from district to district and from Administration to Administration.   Expertise will vary across127
districts too, and Main Justice can do much to ensure that waiver demands are not overused
substitutes for prosecutorial diligence and professionalism.
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Yet centralized decisionmaking has downsides too.  As Dan Kahan has suggested, the
political leadership at the Justice Department is far more apt than U.S. Attorneys to “internalize”
the costs of prosecutorial decisionmaking.   U.S. attorneys trying to advance their local political128
careers, or Assistants trying to cut their professional teeth on conspicuous white collar targets  –129
both types might give too little thought to the economic value their cases can burn up.  On the
other hand, Main Justice may give too much, since the able defense lawyers and lobbyists that
will decry “prosecutorial overreaching” won’t always have counterparts clearly setting out the
economic gains that can flow from aggressive enforcement.   And with the current priorities in130
the counterterrorist and immigration areas, and the odd dynamic that has made violent-crime
enforcement non-negotiable part of the federal enforcement agenda,  Main Justice’s131
institutional commitment to white collar cases may be at a low (or lower) ebb.132
This point about institutional commitment may seem odd to those who have been struck
by the post-Enron rhetoric of the “war on corporate crime.”   And indeed, the Justice133
Department’s Corporate Fraud Task Force regularly touts the numbers of firms and executives
charged and convicted through its efforts.   Recent reports and news stories about the134
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proceeded Milberg Weiss indictment notes that Criminal Division officials evinced far more
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deployment of federal resources, and the view of high level Justice Department decisionmaking
allowed by the recent flap over the fired U.S. Attorneys paints suggests a quite different picture,
however: one in which resource-strapped districts face constant pressure from Washington to
boost their stats with respect to firearms and immigration cases, and have all too little incentive
to pursue the resource-intensive and comparatively slow work of white collar criminal
enforcement.  The budget pressure on U.S. Attorneys Offices is one of the undercovered stories
of recent years, one that the current department leadership apparently prefers remain
undercovered.135
 
But one need not make any assumptions about the relative commitments to corporate
crime enforcement of Washington vs. the districts to expect that any involvement of Washington
in waiver decisions will be in a restrictive direction.  That effect is inherent in the involvement of
an entity that will see only those cases in which a U.S. Attorney’s office wants to seek waiver
(unless the districts respond to increased oversight by exercising less discretion).  And the136
effect is magnified by the bureaucratic imperative that tends to make monitoring agencies justify
their existence.137
See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law138
Litigation Succeeds, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1016 (2004); Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin,
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Some of the same mechanisms of transparency and accountability that the new regulatory
regimes impose on businesses are readily adaptable to the conduct of agencies and
prosecutors themselves.  Prosecutors should articulate standards for the exercise of
discretion, measure their own performance under the standards, provide transparent
procedures for revising the standards in the light of experience, and provide remedies for
targets that believe they have been harmed by violations of the standards.
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Sentencing Guidelines gave Congress a vehicle for unduly interfering in the sentencing process).
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It remains to be seen whether the “consultation” that the McNulty Memo requires of U.S.
Attorneys offices will be merely a formality – in which case the fanfare with which the Memo
was unveiled was simply a pretty transparent ploy to pacify critics – or a means by which the
Criminal Division makes its influence felt on a regular basis.  Perhaps it will lead to an exercise
in “new governance,” with Washington presiding over experimentation in the districts and
promoting the adoption of “best practices.”   We shall see.  But we ought not ignore the138
substantial risk that the new policy will chill the ability of prosecutors to gain the help of
corporations in identifying individual wrongdoers, at a time when the Department’s commitment
to white collar enforcement is under significant strain.
Moreover, we ought not forget that, for all the disputes about the empirics of the world
created by Thompson Memo, the memo itself is a success story in federal criminal law, where
clarity in the principles that guide prosecutors charging discretion has always been hard to find. 
To be sure, as Jerry Lynch has suggested, it is inevitable that among repeat players a common
law of prosecution will emerge.  But the guidance that DOJ promulgations have given in the
corporate area has been exceptional and praiseworthy.  Yes, fans of horizontal equity might not
like idea that corporations get more guidance than regular defendants.  But corporations are
different.  This is a class of defendant that the government generally does not want to prosecute
and generally should not want to prosecute.  It would be ironic if the decision to promulgate and
publicize guidance to line prosecutions made one sensitive enforcement area particularly
amenable to wholesale (not retail) political interference,  and thus gave prosecutors one more139
See David A. Sklansky, Starr, Singleton, and the Prosecutor’s Role, 26 Ford. Urb. L.J.140
509 (1999). 
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reason to love the “just do the right thing” ethos  that dominates most of the Principles of140
Federal Prosecution.
